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Lack of strong central direction and inconsistent policy
execution by all levels have led to a number of problems in
the implementation of component modifications in Navy
aircraft. The problems dealt with in this study are
confined to the areas of replacement procedures for
installed components, implementation schedule, inventory
support (spares, piece parts), and modification funding.
The results of these problems have been excessive disruption
of aircraft readiness and inefficient use of resources.
Recommendations are proposed to improve component
replacement procedures, retain some standardization during




I . INTRODUCTION 1
A . BACKGROUND 1
B . OBJECTIVES 2
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 3
D . SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 4
E . ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 7
II . PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 9
A. THE NAVAL AIRCRAFT MODIFICATION PROGRAM 9
B. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 14
C . INTERIM SUPPORT 15
D . NAVY SUPPLY SUPPORT 15
III. METHODOLOGY 17
A . DATA GATHERING 17
B. RESEARCH VISIT 17
C. DATA REVIEW 18
D . FOLLOW-UP 18
IV . PRESENTATION OF DATA 19
A. CASE STUDY—TACTICAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM
(AN/ASN-123 TACNAV) 20
B. CASE STUDY—AUTOMATIC STABILIZATION
EQUIPMENT (ASE) 24
V. DATA ANALYSIS 28
A. CASE STUDY—TACTICAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM
(AN/ASN-123 TACNAV) 28
IV
B. CASE STUDY—AUTOMATIC STABILIZATION
EQUIPMENT (ASE) 2 9
C . PROBLEM AREAS BY CATEGORY 30




B . RECOMMENDATIONS 37
APPENDIX A: FORMAT, PROPOSED RAMEC SPEEDLETTER
TECHNICAL DIRECTIVE 43
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE—NAVAIR APPROVED RAMEC MESSAGE
TECHNICAL DIRECTIVE 4 7
APPENDIX C: TECHNICAL DIRECTIVE CODES 50
APPENDIX D: ASN-123 TACNAV/SH-2F RETROFIT PROGRAM 52
APPENDIX E : COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES 65
LIST OF REFERENCES 70
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 73
v
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE I : TECHNICAL DIRECTIVE TIMEFRAME CATEGORIES 13



























Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department




Aviation Consolidated Allowance List
Aviation Depot Level Repairable




Conversion in Lieu of Procurement
Configuration Management






































Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System
Modification
Naval Aviation Depot
Naval Aviation Maintenance Office
Naval Air Rework Facility
Naval Air Station
Naval Air Systems Command
Not in Stock




Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Operational, Safety, and Improvement Program
Product Improvement Program
Pack-up Kit
Rapid Action Minor Engineering Change
Ready for Issue
Supplemental Aviation Spares Support
Standard Depot Level Maintenance
Shore Consolidated Allowance List











Modifications to aircraft components have played an
important role in ensuring a high degree of effectiveness
and sustainability within the Naval aircraft community.
Implementing changes in meeting new technological threats,
extending aircraft service life, and correcting safety
deficiencies is often a better cost-effective option than
acquiring new aircraft.
Formal approval of modifications for budgetary purposes
rests with the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)
.
Responsibility for the overall management of the Naval
aircraft modification program lies with the Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR) . NAVAIR delegates this
responsibility to the Naval Aviation Maintenance Office
(NAMO) . NAMO is responsible for planning and executing
modifications through Navy laboratories/field activities
and/or private contractors
.
The author' s previous tour of duty was Staff Supply
Officer at the Anti-Submarine Warfare Wing, U. S. Pacific
Fleet (CASWWP) . This is the largest functional air wing in
the U. S. Navy, responsible for 26 squadrons and a major
Naval air station (NAS North Island) . The squadrons
represent more than 200 aircraft, consisting of about a
dozen major aircraft types, each of which may have a number
of varying configurations
.
At CASWWP, modifications posed a daily struggle for the
staff maintenance and supply personnel. Daily message
traffic invariably included a number of change directives
and miscellaneous logistics problems resulting from
modifications. The staff, along with personnel at the NAS
and squadron levels, was consistently operating in a
reactive mode. It is hoped that this study will clarify
some of the recurring problems with component modifications




A detailed study will be made of the actual
implementation of aircraft component modifications at the
organizational (squadron) and intermediate (NAS) levels.
This will include installed components in aircraft, spare
components for inventory, and supporting piece parts for
inventory. Problems being experienced by the squadrons and
the supporting Naval air station will be discussed and
analyzed through the use of two case studies, with the
primary focus being their impacts on aircraft readiness
rates
.
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
Due to travel funding constraints and a veritable
endless supply of available data, the scope of this research
was limited to three aircraft applications and one
supporting air station; SH-2, SH-3, and SH-60 aircraft and
Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island, California. The three
aircraft types were carefully selected. Each represents a
distinct major category with respect to the modification
programs, and therefore has both unique and common problems
that will be discussed.
The SH-2 is a well-established aircraft supporting the
Light Airborne Multi-purpose System (LAMPS) program
(helicopters assigned to destroyers, frigates, cruisers) and
is currently undergoing retrofit (updating components to
standardize configuration of an aircraft type) and
procurement of some new aircraft simultaneously. The SH-3,
another well-established aircraft, supports aircraft carrier
(CV) operations and is undergoing a major modification
program called Conversion in Lieu of Procurement (CILOP), a
consolidated array of changes which result in a completely
new configuration. The SH-60 is the Navy's newest
helicopter and is still in full production. It is designed
to support both the LAMPS program (SH-60B configuration) and
aircraft carrier operations (SH-60F configuration)
.
Research data collected and utilized is unclassified.
Pertinent classified data was reviewed during the research
period, but primarily reiterated ideas contained in
unclassified data.
A basic assumption in this thesis is that many of the
problems being experienced in the SH-2, SH-3, and SH-60
programs are being experienced Fleet-wide due to common
deficiencies. This is supported by informal conversations
between the author and maintenance/supply personnel who have
recently worked with other aircraft types and by the
author' s previous experience with aircraft maintenance and
material problems.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1
.
Component Replacement Program Policy
In situations where unmodified items have to be
removed from aircraft for modification and then re-
installed, the policy's goal under normal conditions should
be to minimize downtime of the aircraft. This is done by
allowing the squadron to receive a modified component before
having to remove the unmodified component. In many cases,
this is not occurring and results in frequent aircraft
readiness degradation. In addition, there were often many
obstacles which interrupted the flow of unmodified components
from the Fleet to the modification facilities.
2 . Implementation Schedule
In many cases, more than one squadron were
undergoing a component modification simultaneously. Also,
in one case, a second aircraft type started undergoing a
modification while the first aircraft's component spares
were still being modified. Because the changes were long-
term, this resulted in a multitude of different
configurations spread across organizational lines. The
complexities of logistics support in these situations
increase exponentially.
3 . Spares Lag Behind Installed Changes
This is perhaps the most prevalent and hard to solve
problem area. Changes to installed components, often driven
by operational planners, occur as much as two or three years
(sometimes longer) before adequate spares are available in
the Navy inventory. Contributing to this problem are the
lengthening of procurement lead times for spares at the
Aviation Supply Office (ASO) , lack of adequate logistics
support planning at NAVAIR, and contractor delivery delays
.
4. Items Applicable to Specific Production Lots (Lot-
Peculiar)
Aircraft having an active production line are being
produced in consecutive lots, each lot having some
components unique to that lot. This has caused a myriad of
problems in inventory support for the components themselves
and the associated piece parts.
5 . Family Group Coding
As an Inventory Control Point (ICP—ASO for aviation
parts) management strategy, components that are either
partially or totally interchangeable with each other are
grouped together and assigned a Family Group Code (FGC)
.
Partially interchangeable means that they may be
interchangeable under certain conditions (i.e., if modified
in some way) . The coding has been inconsistent in that some
fully interchangeables belong to different families and some
non-interchangeables belong to the same family. This has
been particularly prevalent with modified components. As a
result, the wrong item is often issued to an end user or a
not-in-stock (NIS) status is given when a fully
interchangeable item is actually available. It has also
caused problems in the Aviation Depot Level Repairable
(AVDLR) program.
6 . Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) Program
Funding Problems --NAS Level
Repairable items that must be repaired at the depot
are now funded by each supporting NAS vice being centrally
funded (under the old system) . When a not-ready-for-issue
(NRFI) item is sent to the depot for repair, a ready-for-
issue (RFI) item is ordered by the NAS at the net price
(estimated cost of repair) . If the NRFI item is not
available for turn-in, the RFI item must be ordered at the
standard price (often much higher than net) . As a result of
the FGC problem cited previously, NRFI items are often
turned in, but do not show as a credit to the NAS because
the NRFI and RFI have different FGC's. Thus, the NAS is
charged the much higher standard price vice the lower net
price for the RFI item. In order for the NAS to receive
proper credit, they must challenge each of the erroneous
charges through an off-line process.
An additional funding problem related to
modifications is that many of the repairable and consumable
(throw-away) items (required for the modification and listed
in the Technical Directive or TD) are not funded by NAVAIR
but must be procured by the NAS. For repairables, this is
often at the relatively high standard price. Also, items
missing from modification kits previously procured by NAVAIR
are often purchased using NAS funds in order to expedite the
modification
.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The remaining sections are organized in the following
manner. Chapter II gives a brief description of the
procedural guidance for Naval aircraft component
modifications. The request and implementation processes are
discussed in detail followed by brief summaries of three
interface programs--Configuration Management, Interim
Support, and Navy Supply Support.
Chapter III provides the methodology used by the author
in conducting research. It is presented as a four step
process, although some steps overlap with others.
Chapter IV presents two case studies which exemplify
many of the system problems existing with component
modification programs.
Chapter V provides an analysis of the two case studies
presented in Chapter IV. It also discusses four general
categories of problems in component modification
implementation, citing specific examples where appropriate.
Chapter VI summarizes the main points of the thesis and
presents eleven recommendations with supporting cost-benefit
analyses to assist in making the Naval Aircraft Modification
Program more effective and efficient with less traumatic
impact on aircraft readiness.
II. PROGRAMS AND POLICIES
The following discussion will outline the current
aircraft modification program, with emphasis on the Fleet
interface. It will also include related areas such as
configuration management, interim support, and full Navy
support policies.
A. THE NAVAL AIRCRAFT MODIFICATION PROGRAM
1. OS IP, CILOP, SLEP Programs
The Navy's overall modification program is
designated the Operational, Safety, and Improvement Program
(OSIP) . Its purpose is to define, develop, acquire, and
install engineering changes designed to modernize and
improve the safety, reliability, maintainability, readiness
and/or combat effectiveness of in-service aircraft. [Ref
l:p. 1-1] Within the broad area of changes under OSIP, two
significant areas are worth mentioning. These are the
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and the Conversion in
Lieu of Procurement (CILOP) Program. The purpose of SLEP is
to extend the life of a current weapons system. While some
technological upgrades may be accomplished, the primary
purpose is service life extension. CILOP, on the other
hand, is the conversion of a configuration no longer meeting
a threat to a new configuration which will meet the threat.
It involves numerous technological upgrades. While having
separate purposes, the commonality of some of the upgrades
for both programs may result in a merged effort. This is
also dependent on the timing in the particular weapon's life
cycle
.
The intent of this paper is to focus on individual
component modifications that are not part of a comprehensive
program such as SLEP or CILOP, but do come under the OSIP
umbrella. This is where most problems seem to occur.
2 . Modification Requests
Requests for modifications can originate from three
primary sources. The first is from the particular weapons
system branch at NAVAIR. [Ref. 1] Personnel involved in
the program management of a specific aircraft are in a
position to spot deficiencies, through an effective
monitoring of contractor efforts and Fleet reports.
A second major source is from contractor or Navy
repair/production facilities. These changes are submitted
to NAVAIR in the form of Engineering Change Proposals
(ECP' s) .
The third primary source of modification requests
originate from the Fleet. These modifications are usually
minor in nature and are designated Rapid Action Minor
Engineering Changes (RAMEC's) . There are two phases to the
Fleet request process. The first phase is a RAMEC request
to modify a single aircraft. It can be submitted by a
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squadron or field activity having cognizance over the
specific aircraft type. Approval is at the Type Commander
(TYCOM) level. General items which must be considered are:
[Ref. 2:p. 4-5]
- Logistics material requirements
- Use of space already reserved for approved changes
- Crew confusion if aircraft is transferred
- Expenditure of unplanned man-hours and material
- Performance characteristics being adversely affected
- Configuration provides optimum conditions of safety,
operational, and material readiness
The initial RAMEC request must include a detailed
description of the modification and the rationale justifying
the proposed action. [Ref. 3] Once the TYCOM approves the
preliminary RAMEC, the change is implemented in the
designated aircraft.
The second phase in the RAMEC process is to request
a change to all similar aircraft in the Fleet. The format
for the formal RAMEC is shown in Appendix A. [Ref. 3: end.
(1)] The TYCOM will review the proposal, have another
activity verify the change (in some cases) , coordinate a
review of the proposal from the Weapons System Manager (at
NAVAIR) and Cognizant Field Activity (CFA) for the aircraft
type (usually the depot repair facility) , and forward the
entire package to NAVAIR.
The NAVAIR Change Control Board (CCB) reviews change
proposals from all three primary sources within thirty days
of receipt of the request. If approved, NAVAIR will issue
the required change order to the Fleet via a Technical
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Directive (TD) . [Ref . 4] Format for the TD is given in
Appendix B. [Ref. 4: end. (4)] Various TD codes applicable
to types of changes are given in Appendix C. [Ref. 2 : appen
.
L] This paper is primarily concerned with Airframe Changes
(AFC's) and Avionics Changes (AVC's). AFC's deal with
elements of the airframe and AVC's deal with electronic
assemblies ("black boxes"). Often, AVC's are incorporated
as part of an overall AFC.
3 . Implementation of Modifications
NAVAIR issues the TD and is also responsible for
funding modification of installed components and for
ensuring the distribution of modification kits and
government furnished equipment (GFE) required to modify the
aircraft's components. Data regarding modification kits,
GFE, and spares/piece parts for inventory are provided to
ASO by NAVAIR for initiation of procurement action. As
previously stated, management of the modification program is
delegated by NAVAIR to the Naval Aviation Maintenance Office
(NAMO)
. [Ref. 5] NAMO expedites needed material to the
Fleet in accordance with the time deadline set for
modification completion. This deadline depends on the TD
category. Categories and deadlines are shown in Table I.
[Ref. 6] The goal is to complete the modification within
the timeframe allowed. The TD rescission is a later point
in time when it is assumed that the change is complete and
that excess modification material can be reallocated. If
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the change is not yet complete by the rescission date, the
TD will remain open but special management attention will be
focused on completing the change as quickly as possible.
[Ref. 5]
TABLE I
TECHNICAL DIRECTIVE TIMEFRAME CATEGORIES
Installation Timeframe TD
Category From Date Of Issue Rescission
I--Immediate action 120 days 2 years
U--Urgent action 18 months 5 years
R--Routine action 36 months 6 years
K--Record purpose N/A 2 years
(change already
completed prior
to issuance of TD)
Changes may require depot level implementation
(Naval Aviation Depot--NADEP or contractor) , intermediate
level (Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department--AIMD)
,
or organizational level (squadron) . Depot (D level)
performs the most complex tasks, intermediate (I level)
performs medium to low complexity tasks, and organizational
(O level) is limited primarily to removing and installing
components. If the change requires D or I level action, a
field modification team will often go to the aircraft vice





Although changes are often the best option from a cost-
effective or safety standpoint, the number and extent of
changes must be controlled and documented. As the number of
different configurations multiplies, the level of complexity
for the support functions increases exponentially. Each
time an aircraft component is changed, it may require a
multitude of other changes including:
- Inventory support for new/modified component
- Inventory support for piece parts
- Modify inventory support for old component/piece parts
- Change to test and support equipment
- Maintenance training on new component
- Operator training on new component
Thus, the Configuration Management (CM) Program was
developed to deal with the rapidity of changes in an ever-
changing technology while exercising a requisite amount of
control. Three major areas comprise the CM Program. [Ref.
7:chap. II]
1. Configuration Identification (CI)
CI is the process of identifying current
configurations and maintaining records documenting same.
2 . Configuration Control (CC)
CC encompasses the review process for changes and
the planning and implementation of those changes. This




3. Configuration Status Accounting (CSA)
CSA is the reporting and documentation activities
involved in maintaining continual status throughout the
change process.
C. INTERIM SUPPORT
Due to the long procurement lead times in acquiring
material for stock, an interim support program is often set
up when introducing a new weapons system. Interim support
material is owned by the contractor but located close to the
customer (a selected Navy activity) . It is sold on an item
by item basis as requirements arise. Thus, support is
provided until the Navy can procure sufficient stocks in its
inventory. In the past, this has been primarily used during
the introduction of major weapons systems. However, a recent
move has expanded it aboard aircraft carriers to include new
components/repair parts in addition to entire systems. [Ref.
8] Applicability to shore support facilities is still being
developed.
D. NAVY SUPPLY SUPPORT
Navy inventories are divided into three categories.
First is the wholesale level. This is stock managed by the
Inventory Control Point (ICP) . The ICP for aviation
material is the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) . Wholesale
material is stocked at a number of stock points worldwide
and is used as a back-up for the next two levels.
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The next level is called retail intermediate. This is
stock managed by the stock points to support their
respective geographical regions. It is a back-up for retail
consumable inventories and, at times, used for direct
support to end users
.
The third level is retail consumable. It is managed by
retail activities (ships, NAS's) and has fixed allowances
(maximum quantities authorized) for each line item based on
the number and type of aircraft supported. At an NAS,
retail consumable stock can be split between air station
support and Light Airborne Multi-purpose System (LAMPS)
support. Aircraft carrier (CV) support stock is called the
Aviation Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL) , NAS support
stock is called the Shore Consolidated Allowance List
(SHORCAL) , and LAMPS support stock is in the form of pack-up






The first stage in the research effort was to gather
copies of applicable instructions and other written
communication. This was accomplished by reviewing the Naval
Postgraduate School Library files, requesting related topic
information from the Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange (DLSIE) , and telephone requests for copies of
instructions from NAVAIR, ASO, CNAP (Commander, Naval Air
Forces, Pacific), and CASWWP. The data was then sorted and
reviewed in preparation for the research visit. A list of
questions and in-depth areas for study were developed.
B. RESEARCH VISIT
A one week visit was conducted at NAS North Island where
three echelons within the Naval Aviation Command structure
are co-located, CNAP, CASWWP, and NAS/squadrons . Two days
were spent at the NAS/squadron level conducting personal
interviews with key maintenance and supply personnel. Two
days were spent at the functional wing (CASWWP) level, again
conducting interviews with key personnel. One-half day was
spent interviewing type commander (CNAP) staff personnel and
one-half day utilized to consolidate the information
gathered and investigate any obvious discrepancies.
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Throughout the week, calls were made to other interface
commands as required. Also, the author reviewed countless
instructions, messages, and other written correspondence,
making copies of the more pertinent ones for later use
during the write-up.
C. DATA REVIEW
Following the research trip, much time was spent sifting
through the data collected. It was sorted in accordance
with the thesis chapters and material that was either
redundant or non-applicable was discarded.
D . FOLLOW-UP
After becoming familiar with the data collected, the
author began to make notes and formulate additional
questions. Follow-up telephone interviews and, when
possible, personal interviews were conducted to obtain
answers. Also, some additional written data was received.
These follow-up actions continued through much of the rough
draft preparation stage.
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IV. PRESENTATION OF DATA
Much of the problem data in this and the following
chapter resulted from personal interviews with maintenance
and supply personnel at the squadron and NAS levels, as well
as data provided by the functional wing and type commander
staffs. In addition, the author's previous tour of duty at
the functional wing provided valuable insight into many of
the more complex issues. Supporting documentation includes
Naval message traffic, minutes from meetings, and reports
tailored to a particular weapon system.
This discussion will consist of case histories on two
major components that have undergone modification, the
Tactical Navigation System (AN/ASN-123 TACNAV) for the SH-2
and SH-3, and the Automatic Stabilization Equipment (ASE)
for the SH-3. These particular modifications required
action and coordination by a number of different echelons.
Both were selectively chosen and are not typical of
component modifications in general. However, the problems
experienced thus far in both cases are indicative of
problems being experienced in a number of other component
modification programs.
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A. CASE STUDY—TACTICAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM (AN/ASN-123
TACNAV)
1 . Background
The AN/ASN-123 TACNAV Product Improvement Program
(PIP) commenced in May 1985 for the SH-2 (AFC 302) and in
February 1987 for the SH-3 (AFC s 420/424/428). This
retrofit program consisted of converting the AN/ASN-123A to
an AN/ASN-123C configuration by modifying five major
repairable components or Weapon Replaceable Assemblies
(WRA's) that were installed in aircraft and held in
inventory. These five components were a computer processor,
display indicator, control indicator, computer control, and
mount. It also included the procurement and distribution of
both supporting repairable components or Shop Replaceable
Assemblies (SRA's) and supporting piece parts (consumables)
for stocking in the inventory. [Ref. 9] A presentation
summary of significant program elements is provided in
Appendix D
.
SH-2 aircraft coming off the production line were
equipped with the AN/ASN-123C configuration starting in
February 1985. This meant that all SH-2 aircraft produced
prior to that date had to be modified as well as all SH-3
aircraft. Inventory spares to be modified included those at
wholesale, retail intermediate, and retail consumable
levels. The retail consumable level included the SHORCAI/s,
AVCAL's, and PUK' s
.
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Actual modification of both installed components and
spare TACNAV systems would be performed by Teledyne Systems
located at Northridge, California. The original plan at
NAVAIR was to send eight sets of the AN/ASN-123A per month
to Teledyne for modification, starting with the SH-2 . These
sets would be a combination of installed components and
spares. Teledyne, starting with an initial pool of eight
modified units, would immediately send one AN/ASN-123C set
to the Fleet upon receipt of an unmodified unit. This
replacement program would preclude extraordinary delays
while maintaining asset accountability.
2 . Implementation
Shipments from the Fleet began in late 1985. By
February 1986, the Fleet was experiencing delays in receipt
of modified components. [Ref. 10] Reasons given by
Teledyne were cont r act or / subcont ract or technical
difficulties. The delays were causing squadrons to
cannibalize (remove from one aircraft and install in
another) systems from low priority to high priority aircraft
and to send LAMPS detachments to sea with no spare TACNAV s
in the PUK's. This seriously degraded aircraft readiness
and resulted in many additional man-hours spent
cannibalizing and expediting.
As a standard procedure of the retrofit program,
screening of Fleet activities for old configurations was
also being performed. There were numerous problems
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associated with this effort. First, Teledyne would only
accept complete TACNAV systems (all five WRA's) for
modification. Therefore, Fleet activities with some WRA's
in inventory needing modification were put on hold because
they were missing other WRA's. The policy was finally
changed in early 1987. Teledyne decided to accept
incomplete systems and modification would occur on a "not to
interfere" basis with completed systems. [Ref. 11]
A second problem with the screening process was that
many of the assets held in PUK' s were constantly being
transferred between ships or between a ship and its
supporting NAS . Custody could easily change in the time
between screening and issuance of a shipping directive.
A third problem was that many assets were
unauthorized spares (not on record) and the formal screening
process was ineffective in dealing with this problem.
The retrofit program for the SH-2 continued through
the remainder of 1986. By January 1987, all SH-2 installed
components had been modified. [Ref. 12] Spares supporting
the SH-2 were still undergoing modification. The decision
was made to immediately commence the retrofit program for
the SH-3. Spares for the SH-2 would now compete with
installed components and spares for the SH-3. Meanwhile,
the screening process continued with very limited success
due to the problems previously noted.
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With aircraft carrier support always a high
priority, the introduction of the SH-3 brought a heightened
interest to the retrofit program. Of particular note was a
situation involving the USS MIDWAY. The MIDWAY, due to its
forward deployed status, receives more attention on the
average than other aircraft carriers. Its squadron's SH-3
aircraft were among the first to receive the modified
TACNAV. However, as with other activities, its inventory,
or AVCAL, did not simultaneously receive spares or
supporting piece parts for installed components. In March
of 1987, the USS MIDWAY requested expediting assistance due
to NRFI installed components with no spares to repair or
replace. [Ref. 13] The SH-3 Fleet activities were now
beginning to experience what the SH-2 activities had
experienced for the past year-and-a-half : readiness
degradation due to lack of spares' support.
The old nemesis, screening for unmodified systems,
had reached a critical stage by October 1987. Fifty systems
could not be located following a worldwide screen by ASO.
[Ref. 14] The retrofit program was due for completion in
June 1988. The plan was for all unmodified systems to be
shipped to Teledyne by March 1988. Thus, NAVAIR directed
ASO and the TYCOM' s to conduct a physical screen (visually
sight components) at activities under their cognizance.
[Ref. 15] This was completed and some additional unmodified
systems were discovered.
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At the time of this writing, a search is still being
conducted for close to 50 unmodified systems. The
modification line at Teledyne remains open but cost-
effective pressures may soon shut it down. All installed
components have been modified. Allowances have been
established in the SHORCAL's, AVCAL's, and PUK' s for
modified WRA/s, SRA's, and piece parts. However, many are
still waiting for actual assets to fill allowance levels.
[Ref. 16]
B. CASE STUDY- -AUTOMATIC STABILIZATION EQUIPMENT (ASE)
1 . Background
The SH-3 ASE Modification Program commenced in
October 1985 (AFC 396) . This program consisted of modifying
two WRA' s that were installed in aircraft and stocked in
inventory. The two components were an ASE amplifier (amp)
assembly and a control panel. The ASE amp contained seven
SRA' s which had to be procured and stocked in inventory
along with supporting piece parts for both the WRA' s and
SRA's. The part number suffix was used to distinguish the
unmodified ASE amp from the modified, -21 for the old amp
and -25 for the new. [Ref. 17]
The modification would be performed at the Naval Air
Rework Facility (NARF) , Pensacola, Florida (now renamed
Naval Aviation Depot) . In order to establish an initial
pool of assets, the plan was to remove and modify -21' s from
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SH-3's undergoing Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM)
,
an aircraft periodic overhaul, at NARF Pensacola. However,
this pool would be decreased somewhat because of the
requirement that aircraft leaving SDLM would have the -25
installed. [Ref. 18] Once a pool was established, Fleet
activities would request -25' s from NARF Pensacola. Once
the components were received, -21' s would be sent back to
the NARF.
2 . Implementation
Requisitions were first submitted for the -25 in
early 1986. There was an immediate problem of insufficient
-21' s (retrograde) at NARF Pensacola. NAVAIR reiterated the
requirement for Fleet activities to immediately ship
retrograde upon receipt of -25' s. [Ref. 19]
Meanwhile, requests for AVCAL and SHORCAL allowances
for WRA/SRA/piece parts were being submitted. Early
indications of high failure rates resulted in higher and
higher stock level adjustments. [Ref. 20]
Continued failures in the -25, as documented by
Fleet squadrons, resulted in a suspension of the
modification program by NAVAIR in June 1986. Modification
of WRA' s was halted but SRA' s would continue to be modified
to support -25' s already in the Fleet. An engineering
investigation was begun to determine the cause of the
problems. [Ref. 21]
25
The suspension in the middle of a major retrofit
program created a myriad of logistics support problems.
Within squadrons, some aircraft had the -21 and others had
the -25. Those preparing to deploy overseas could not
afford the luxury of having both configurations due to both
operational and maintenance/supply support considerations.
Because the -21 enjoyed greater maintenance and inventory
stock support, the decision was made to deconfigure all
aircraft in each deploying squadron back to the -21. This
resulted in numerous cannibalizations and cross-decking
(shifting assets from one ship to another) actions. [Ref.
22]
Following an extensive investigation which involved
numerous flight tests and technical reviews, the problems
were resolved and the retrofit program was re-started in
January 1987. [Ref. 23] Due to the lessons learned from
the deconfiguration process, the revised retrofit schedule
reflected a policy of modifying one squadron at a time. An
additional benefit to this policy was that AVCAL allowances
for squadrons' respective ships could now be timed to
coincide with the schedule. However, other problems still
developed.
Almost immediately, the consistent lack of spares
started to impact aircraft readiness. [Ref. 24] Each time
an installed ASE would fail, there were no assets in stock
to replace it and, therefore, the aircraft's mission
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capability was partially degraded for an extended period of
time. On an aircraft carrier, this was particularly acute
since one aircraft represents one sixth of the ship's SH-3
squadron
.
At NARF Pensacola, other problems were hampering
efforts to turn out -25' s. The low influx of -21' s plus a
shortage of modification kits had combined to slow the
modification line. [Ref. 25] Fleet activities responded by
expediting shipment of -21' s to the NARF and NAVAIR
increased the availability of modification kits.
At the time of this writing, all installed
components have been modified. All inventory allowances
have been established for WRA's, SRA's, and piece parts.
Most of the WRA allowances have been filled in the AVCAL'
s
but not in the SHORCAL's. Both AVCAL' s and SHORCAL' s are
still awaiting many SRA's and piece parts. [Ref. 16]
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V. DATA ANALYSIS
The first part of this chapter will analyze each of the
two case studies presented in the previous chapter. This
will be followed by a presentation and analysis of problem
categories in component modification programs, citing
examples from the SH-2, SH-3, and SH-60 aircraft
communities. The intent of this analysis is to offer the
author' s interpretation of the problems and the extent of
their impacts.
A. CASE STUDY—TACTICAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM (AN/ASN-123
TACNAV)
The component replacement program for the TACNAV
required the Fleet to send an unmodified system to Teledyne
before they could receive a modified version. Although
partly buffered by the initial pool at Teledyne and by
smaller pools set up at functional air wings, it still
resulted in excessive periods of time when aircraft were not
fully mission capable (FMC) . This was compounded when the
modification production line experienced delays during its
first few months of operation.
In the initial screening process for old configurations,
a lack of a comprehensive worldwide screen and aggressive
follow-up action led to numerous delays in identifying where
the assets were located and expediting them to Teledyne.
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PUK mobility, although a problem, could have been
effectively dealt with through sufficient planning and
coordination. Teledyne's initial policy of accepting only
complete systems did much to hamper the return from Fleet
activities of all assets that would eventually need
modification
.
In early 1987, with all SH-2 installed components
modified, but only a handful of spares and supporting piece
parts available, the decision to immediately commence the
SH-3 modification program seemed premature. This was later
borne out when the readiness of both aircraft were impacted
due to lack of spares.
B. CASE STUDY—AUTOMATIC STABILIZATION EQUIPMENT (ASE)
In this component replacement program, Fleet activities
could first order and receive the modified system before
sending in the unmodified component. It made more sense
from an aircraft readiness standpoint, but required a large
initial pool of modified systems. The decision to use
removed SDLM aircraft components for the initial pool, yet
still require departing SDLM aircraft to also have modified
systems installed, resulted in an insufficient quantity for
this pool. Shortages of retrograde assets (to be modified)
were predictable and occurred almost immediately after
commencement of the program.
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Suspension of the retrofit program would have caused
problems under any circumstances, but the problems were
increased in this situation due to the initial practice of
implementing the modification in several squadrons
simultaneously. Immediately following suspension of the
retrofit program, crisis management became the norm as both
staff and squadron personnel worked frantically to
standardize each squadron. This was especially a problem
for squadrons preparing to deploy. It resulted in
innumerable man-hours spent on cannibalization and cross-
decking efforts.
As in the case of the TACNAV, the inventory spares and
piece parts to support the installed ASE system lagged far
behind. This has seemed to become an expected and accepted
mode of operation for component modification programs in
general, despite its significant and often long-term effect
on aircraft readiness.
C. PROBLEM AREAS BY CATEGORY
1 . Spares Lag Behind Installed Changes
Retail allowances for spares and piece parts to
support a modification are often requested from ASO at the
same time that the installed components are being modified.
Wholesale assets to fill the retail consumable allowances
are usually either not available or available but
insufficient to fill all the demands. In some cases,
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procurement has not even been initiated at the time that the
allowance requests are received at ASO. Procurement lead
time for new items can often be three years or longer so the
gap between a modified configuration in the aircraft and
spares support for that modification can be significant.
For aircraft carriers and LAMPS ships, this can quickly lead
to serious readiness problems. Thus, what usually occurs
prior to a squadron' s deployment is a flurry of cross-
decking, cannibalizations, and possibly deconfigurations to
ensure some measure of spares support
.
2. Items Applicable to Specific Production Lots (Lot-
Peculiar)
This has been a major problem for the SH-60 and, to
a lesser degree, the SH-2 . The SH-60 community is currently
made up of 105 aircraft which have been produced in five
successive lots. Each lot's aircraft have components that
are peculiar to that lot. This is due to changes and
improvements that have been incorporated in each lot. Over
time, the intent is to standardize the configuration of all
lots. However, in the interim, support must be provided for
a multitude of configurations. [Ref. 26]
The SH-2 is a bit simpler, but the same problems
exist. It basically consists of aircraft being produced on
a current contract (new buy) and aircraft produced on
earlier contracts (old buy) . Again, the intent is to
standardize the configuration over time. [Ref. 27]
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A good example of the problems in supporting a
number of different configurations at the retail consumable
inventory level is the PUK support for the SH-60. NAS North
Island is the largest PUK manager in the Navy. A summary of
their operations is provided in Table II. [Ref. 28] For
the SH-60, they manage a total of 54 PUK' s divided into
three categories. The first is a basic kit which is
provided to each squadron detachment aboard a ship. The
second is an out-of-area (00A) PUK, an augment to the basic
kit for detachments operating far away from a ready source
of supply. The third is a two-aircraft PUK, an augment to




PACK-UP KITS MANAGED BY NAS NORTH ISLAND
Aircraft Type of Number Numbesr of Line




SH-60 00A 13 42
SH-60 2 A/C 10 14
SH-2 Basic 33 667
SH-2 00A 1 75
CH-46 Basic 11 1603
All of the allowance levels are standardized for the
basic, OOA, and two-aircraft PUK's. However, actual on hand
assets can vary widely, especially for those items
supporting a recent modification (initial asset shortage)
.
By their very nature, many of the lot-peculiar items are a
32
result of a recent modification. Therefore, some PUK' s may
support particular lot aircraft better than others.
However, since many PUK' s are on ships and not under the
direct control of a supporting NAS, intensified management
to optimally support different configurations with available
assets is not possible.
3 . Family Group Coding
As mentioned previously, family groupings are items
sharing some level of interchangeability . Each family is
assigned a four digit alpha-numeric code called a Family
Group Code (FGC) . This has proven to be effective in the
management of inventories by the ICP (ASO) . It has also
been useful at the Fleet level by directing attention toward
substitutes when the primary item is not available.
Problems that have developed with FGC support during
component modifications are attributable to two major
causes. The first is that interchangeability codes assigned
to spares have commonly been in error. This allows items
with no interchangeability relationship to be in the same
family group and allows other items that are fully
interchangeable to be assigned in different family groups.
An example of this is the torqueless grips rotor brake for
the SH-60. [Ref. 26] The old brake, national stock number
(NSN) 1RD1630-01-161-4376, was modified to a new
configuration, NSN 1RD1630-01-275-5612 . Both are fully
interchangeable with each other, yet belong to different
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family groups. This situation is currently being corrected,
but has already caused problems in AVDLR and retail inventory
support. [Ref. 29] In AVDLR, if the old item becomes not-
ready-for-issue (NRFI) and is turned in and a modified
component is then ordered, no credit is given for the turn-in
since the family group is different. As mentioned
previously, this requires the NAS to challenge each
transaction in order to prevent being charged a higher price
than would normally be charged. [Ref. 30] In the retail
inventory support area, a requisition for a particular item
is not automatically referred to the interchangeables or
substitutes if the first is not available. Again, it
requires manual intervention to ensure that all possible
sources are screened. This manual process causes long delays
which may be critical to aircraft awaiting parts.
The second cause of FGC problems stems from the
methodology used by ASO to make FGC assignments. Items that
are only interchangeable if modified are considered to have
some level of interchangeability . Therefore, they are
placed in the same family. This has created a number of
problems for the squadrons by filling demands for modified
components with unmodified components and vice versa. In
many cases, these components cannot be used in aircraft due
to differing interface elements. An example is the main
gearbox for the SH-3 . [Ref. 31] A related problem
experienced by NAS North Island is the inability of their
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automated inventory system to manage two items having the
same FGC at separate allowance levels in the retail
inventory. They have managed to work around this to some
extent through the use of locally assigned family group
codes. [Ref. 32] These can further differentiate between
different interchangeability codes within families. A
problem still exists, however, in the interface with the
wholesale and retail intermediate inventories which are
managed by centrally assigned FGC's.
4. AVDLR Funding Problems --NAS Level
The lack of credit for turn-ins due to FGC variances
has been discussed in the preceding section. The other
major problem in AVDLR funding and component modifications
is the fact that numerous components are now being locally
funded out of the NAS AVDLR budget vice being centrally
funded. This has caused a strain on already scarce AVDLR
dollars at the NAS level. It is also extremely difficult
for the NAS to estimate the budget requirement for
modifications in advance since they are not included in the
initial planning phases for modifications. At times, the
NAS has been reimbursed for dollars spent on a specified
modification program but this is the exception rather than
the rule. [Ref. 33]
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The Naval aircraft modification program has been vital
in achieving a cost-effective and safe approach to meet
mission requirements for the Naval Air Forces. The program,
as defined, allows for an orderly procession of events from
change recommendations to implementation. Configuration
Management ensures careful analysis of each change
(necessity, urgency) and interim support provides a tool to
help close the time gap between the modification and
spares/piece parts support.
Unfortunately, modification implementations have not
always followed established procedural guidelines. The
combination of rapidly changing technology, increasing
safety awareness, and a continual reevaluation of threat
results in a high frequency of changes which often outpaces
inflexible procedures. This places implementing activities
in a reactive mode, expending excessive man-hours and other
resources in an attempt to meet deadlines.
Specific problem areas highlighted have included
component replacement procedures, implementation schedule,
lag between changes to installed components and spares
support, lot-peculiar item support, family group coding
problems, and AVDLR funding shortfalls. These and other
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problems were clarified through the development of two case
studies and numerous other examples. The intent was to show
the extent of modification implementation problems and their
associated impact on fleet readiness. Although the study
was limited to three aircraft types, the problems are
generic in nature and apply to other aircraft types as well.
B
. RECOMMENDATIONS
To resolve or alleviate problems discussed thus far,
eleven recommendations will now be presented. A few of
these recommendations are currently being followed, but not
on a consistent basis. A cost-benefit analysis for each of
the recommendations is provided in Appendix E. [Ref. 34]
1
. Give Fleet Activities Advantage on Component
Replacement Programs
In the two case studies previously discussed, there
was one major difference on policy for replacing installed
components. In the TACNAV, Fleet activities had to turn in
an unmodified system before receiving a modified system. In
the ASE system, Fleet activities could requisition and
receive a modified system before sending in the unmodified
system. This latter policy is preferred, since it minimizes
the time that aircraft are missing components. It assumes
that the old configuration is not a safety hazard and that
sufficient pool assets of modified components are available.
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2.
Rapidly Identify and Coordinate with Activities
Having Old Configurations
Prior to modification implementation, an effective
one-time worldwide screen for old assets (including
unauthorized spares) should be conducted by a central
authority (i.e., NAVAIR, ASO) vice delegating the screen
execution down through the chain of command. Those in the
chain of command should be fully informed of the screen and
become actively involved with coordinating the schedule of
retrograde movement. PUK coordination should come under the
direct control of the NAS owning the assets, whether they be
physically at the NAS or on loan to a ship.
3 . Ensure Modification Policies do not Conflict with
Retrograde Movement
All retrograde needing modification should not be
hampered by contractor policy (i.e., accept only complete
systems)
. If the policy cannot be changed, retrieval from
the Fleet should still occur and collection and integration,
if possible, could occur at some intermediate point. Due to
the Fleet's operations and often remote locations,
opportunities to retrieve should be taken as schedules
permit
.
4 . Finish Spares Support for One Aircraft Type Before
Starting Modification of Installed Components on
Another
In a component modification program affecting more
than one aircraft type, all installed components are
normally modified on one type before proceeding to the next.
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It would also seem prudent to ensure adequate spares support
for the first type before proceeding to the next. This not
only prevents a lack of support and readiness degradation in
multiple aircraft types/mission areas, but also puts
pressure on the spares support structure to keep pace with
modifications
.
5. Modify One Squadron at a Time
Standardization must be one of the guiding
principles throughout a component modification process to
lessen the complexities of logistics support. Modified
components produced on a piecemeal basis should be
incorporated in one squadron at a time. This will do much
to lessen the impact of any suspensions or delays in
retrofit programs.
6. Expedite Navy Spares Support for Modifications
With recent emphasis on competition, fairness to
small businesses, and other trends in the purchasing arena,
procurement lead time for new items has increased
dramatically. This places an even greater burden upon
NAVAIR to notify ASO as early as possible concerning
component modification spares and piece parts requirements.
It does little good for retail allowances to be established
if there are no assets in the wholesale system to fill them.
In addition, selective expediting of spares tailored




Contract for Interim Support in Cases Where Navy
Spares Support Cannot Keep Pace
Interim support has been used successfully to ensure
adequate spares support for new weapons systems entering the
Fleet. On a smaller scale, it could be just as effective
for component modification programs. The additional costs
for expanded interim support would be offset by those now
being expended due to lack of spares (cannibalization,
cross-decks, readiness degradation)
.
8 . Improve Tailoring of Retail Allowances to Support
Differing Configurations
Situations in which long-term changes preclude
standardization within an aircraft type for an extended
period of time (multi-year) require some tailoring of
inventory support. Decreasing numbers of unmodified systems
and increasing numbers of modified systems need to be
supported simultaneously. Thus far, a limited amount of
tailoring occurs in the SHORCAL and AVCAL but the process
lacks central direction. Retail activities must request
splinter (allowance augment due to change) SHORCAL' s /AVCAL ' s
as needs arise, often when the changes are actually being
implemented. This is often too late to support early
failures of the modified system from the retail level, even
with wholesale assets available. Support for the old
configuration often remains in the inventory until long
after the modification is completed, contributing to the
amount of excess stock.
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Tailoring PUK allowances is non-existent. When a
modification program begins or when a change is implemented
on the production line (lot-peculiar items) , support is
incorporated into all PUK' s for the aircraft type. In the
case of the SH-60 at NAS North Island, this means that a
change which begins in one or two aircraft and proceeds
slowly will result in immediate allowance increases to all
31 basic PUK's. This puts 31 active requisitions into the
system for a particular item when only a few items will
actually be needed in the near term. These requisitions may
be competing with urgently needed AVCAL/SHORCAL
requirements. The end result may be oversupport in PUK's
and undersupport in SHORCAI/ s/AVCAL' s . Additionally,
obsolete items are often not deleted from the PUK's until
long after the modification has been completed, taking up
critical space on the LAMPS ships.
9. Increase Review and Validation of Interchangeability
Codes for Systems Being Modified
Interchangeability code assignment errors can
seriously impact aircraft readiness and AVDLR budgets. This
is especially true for modified systems. A formal review of




10. Redesign the FGC/Interchangeability Code (IC)
Interface to Allow Some Differentiation by IC Within
Families
The wholesale, intermediate, and retail inventory
systems must be able to distinguish between modified and
unmodified items within the same family when setting stock
levels and issuing material. This is a prerequisite to the
tailoring effort discussed previously.
11. Centrally Fund Requirements for Modification of
Installed Components
All modified components listed in the Technical
Directive for installation in aircraft should be centrally
funded. An exception is in cases where local (NAS) funding
would preclude extensive time delays in implementing urgent
changes. Under these situations, reimbursement should be
forthcoming from the central fund.
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APPENDIX A
FORMAT, PROPOSED RAMEC SPEEDLETTER TECHNICAL DIRECTIVE
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COMNAV A I RPAC INST 5215.6C
7 DEC 1984
Format, Proposed RAMEC Speedletter Technical Directive
To: Cognizant Functional Wing
Subj: PROPOSED RAMEC,
Ref: (a) As applicable
Encl : (1) As applicable
1. Cog Code: (Originator's name, activity, AUTOVON telephone number)
2. Category: Routine or urgent
3. Documentation Affected:
a. (List NAVAIR publications affected by change.)
b. (List vendor/CFA drawings)






4. Purpose: (Provide full justification for change).
5. Application:
a. Basic Equipment T/M/S S/N
b. Trainers: (State If applicable)
c. Spares: (State If applicable)
6. Compliance:
a. Basic Equipment: Shall be modified by organizational (or
intermediate, as applicable) maintenance activities, not later than next
phase Inspection after receipt of parts.
b. Trainers: (State if applicable)
c. Spares: (State If applicable)
7. Man-hours required:
a. Basic Equipment: No. of Men Skill Total Man-hours
b. Trainers: .
- c. Spares: .
8. Supply Data:
a. Requirements for basic equipment:
(1) Parts/material required:
QTY P/N FSCM NOMEN SMSR NSN SOURCE
(2) Peculiar Ground Support Equipment required:
(3) Parts/material removed:
QTY P/N NOMEN NSN DISPOSITION
b. Requirements for trainers: .
c. Requirements for spares: .
9. Reldent1ficat1on:
Prev Prev Superseding Superseding




a. (Provide complete detailed Instructions on how to accomplish
modification, Including reference to tech manuals and other data required to
locate particular Items. If both "0" and "I" level work Is Involved,
segregate Into two parts, grouping actions required by each level of
maintenance. )
11. Weight and balance: (Compute effective as applicable.)
12. Records affected: Record accomplishment of this directive in OPNAV Form
4790/24A and update ATDR lists two (2) and four (4), as appropriate. Report
compliance via OPNAV Form 4790/60 (VIDS/MAF).
13. Verified by: (To be completed by functional wing commander; including
activity, aircraft type and BUNO, If applicable.)
14. Rescission date: (Leave blank.)
15. Related 1nst-uct1ons/1nformat1on: (Include any data package,
requirements, special Instructions and detailed justifications, 1f










NAVAIR APPROVED RAMEC MESSAGE TECHNICAL DIRECTIVE
NOTE
ROUTINE
FROM: COMNAVAIRSYSCOM WASHINGTON DC















-7 AIRFRAME CHANGE NO. 403 , TD CODE 50, EPP ADVISORY LIGHT INSTALLATION
(RAMEC P-10-85), WUC 41216
A. MSG OR SPEEDLETTER THAT SUBMITTED PROPOSED RAMEC TO NAVAIRHQ
1 . COG CODE
:
NAME, CODE AND AUTOVON NOTE :
OF THE COGNIZANT ENGINEER.
"
NAME, CODE AND AUTOVON




2. CATEGORY: ROUTINE ("URGENT" ONLY IF SAFETY IS INVOLVED AND APPROVED
BY CCB)
3. DOCUMENTATION AFFECTED: (SAME AS INCOMING MESSAGE OR SPEEDLETTER)
NOTE : FOR AMENDMENTS, ONLY SHOW BASIC TD NUMBER
AND DATE-TIME GROUP OF THE MESSAGE.
4. PURPOSE: (SAME AS INCOMING MESSAGE)
DISTRIBUTION: (NAVAIRHQ)
AIR-1022/ 41054/ 410 / 411
CHOP CYCLE: NAVAIRHQ








PARAGRAPH 5. THROUGH 14. - SAME FORMAT AND CONTENT AS
ENCLOSURE (3)
15. RELATED INSTRUCTIONS/INFORMATION:
A. RAMEC P-10-85 SUBMITTED BY REFERENCE (A) WAS APPROVED
11 MAR 85 BY ACCB NO. 851-109.
B. A0toOH\)OKfcT'. (IDENTIFY (Vjf=H)p|\)CXcCOV jr CFA)
(1) PROVIDE MICROFILM COPIES OF NEW OR REVISED DRAWINGS TO
NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC, CODE 03
(2) PREPARE AND COORDINATE PUBLICATIONS DATA PACKAGE SUBMITTAL
WITH NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC, CODE 02D, AND
(3) PREPARE AND FORWARD DESIGN CHANGE NOTICES TO ASO, CODE WSS2-A
C. NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC: COORDINATE TECHNICAL MANUAL UPDATES WITH










58 Accessory Bulletins (AYB)
61 Accessory Changes (AYC)
94 Airborne Tactical Software
Bulletins (ASB)
93 Airborne Tactical Software
Changes (ASC)
76 Airborne Weapon Bulletins (AWB)
75 Airborne Weapon Changes (AWC)
67 Aircrew System Bulletins (ACB)
66 Aircrew System Changes (ACC)
74 Airframe Bulletins (AFB)
50 Airframe Changes (AFC)
57 Aviation Armament Bulletins (AAB)
56 Aviation Armanent Changes (AAC)
55 Avionics Bulletins (AYB)
54 Avionics Changes (AVC)
52 Dynamic Component Bulletins (DCB)
51 Dynamic Component Changes (DCC)
79 Meteorological Equipment Bulletins
(MEB)
73 Meteorological Equipment Changes
(MEC)
69 Photographic Bulletins (PUB)
68 Photographic Changes (PHC)






















Power Plant Changes (PPC)
Propeller Bulletins (PRB)
Propeller Changes (PRO
Quick Engine Change Kit Bulletins
(QEB)
Quick Engine Change Kit Changes
(QEC)
Ship Installed and Expeditionary
Airfield Launch, Recovery, and Visual
Landing Aid Equipment Bulletins
(LRB)
Ship Installed and Expeditionary
Airfield Launch, Recovery, and Visual
Landing Aid Equipment Changes (LRC)
Support Equipment Bulletins (SEB)
Support Equipment Changes (SEC)
Support Software Bulletins (SSB)
Support Software Changes (SSC)
Target Control System Bulletins (TCB)
Target Control System Changes (ICC)
Trainer Software Bulletins (TSB)




V AST System Changes
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APPENDIX D













































































































































































































































































a: 5 QL \ CO CO a: fc q: CLQ. < Q. to
o
UJ UJ CL 0. Z>
OS
3 * * * * * « o * *













<M O co CL o
fe UJa: rr T

















































































































& o i Q 5 2 ce 2 CL




































































































































































































































































- « 3S O
o s
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o c - o o
















n — o • — — M — o o o — ** ~- ^»o —
Ik
a
































































































































































































o - - r> o V o
r>
c e o o o o o c o o o
— V V o o « o
I
o - o - - o o
a. it in o




z > IC <
>-> a s _
« < o a


























































































































































v - a o o o o c o c o o o o ie o
n z •o
- O -* e






a. in in o




z > ie <








o o o o o
c




















































































































































































































































z > ic <
u a <r _
























O J u e
z u
1/1 X • > «i
> »« X oH > o o u u.
o >- z z o
< u — X
< a J
H- D • <
z U JX ^ *- **
< < u a < o in
-1 a x —
l/l
K S
_l _l K o o
< < III z <•>
*- l/l < -v
o O i/i a -




Costs and benefits for each recommendation are
identified below. In some cases, quantification is possible
but varies widely with different modification programs. In
cases where a one-time system cost or benefit could perhaps
be quantified, other significant costs and benefits within
the same analysis cannot. In many other cases,
quantification would at best be a highly subjective
procedure. It is therefore left to the decision maker to
weigh the identified costs and benefits for each
recommendation and determine a course of action.





- Larger initial pool of modified assets
2 . Benefits :
- Increased aircraft readiness due to less
aircraft down time awaiting components
- Decreased cross-decking and cannibalization
efforts
B. RECOMMENDATION 2—RAPIDLY IDENTIFY AND COORDINATE WITH
ACTIVITIES HAVING OLD CONFIGURATIONS
1 . Costs :
- Increased coordination/monitoring efforts at
NAVAIR, ASO, Staff, and NAS levels
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Benefits :
- Improved asset visibility/accountability
- Improved movement flow of unmodified and
modified assets between Fleet and modification
facility
C. RECOMMENDATION 3—ENSURE MODIFICATION POLICIES DO NOT




- Increased vendor charge for more flexibility in
modification process
- Increased costs associated with maintaining
temporary pools of unmodified assets
2 . Benefits :
- Improved flow of unmodified assets from Fleet to
modification facility
RECOMMENDATION 4 --FINISH SPARES SUPPORT FOR ONE AIRCRAFT
TYPE BEFORE STARTING MODIFICATION OF INSTALLED COMPONENTS
ON ANOTHER
1 Costs :
- Increased potential for loss of funding source
for modification of subsequent aircraft types
due to extended time frame
- Extended operations with unmodified components
by subsequent aircraft types
2 . Benefits :
- Increased aircraft readiness due to improved
spares support
- Increased pressure on spares support structure
to keep pace with aircraft component
modifications
- Less expediting costs in meeting customer
demands
- Decreased cross-decking and cannibalization
efforts
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E. RECOMMENDATION 5--MODIFY ONE SQUADRON AT A TIME
1. Costs:
- No significant net costs
2 . Benefits :
- Improved logistics support (spares, training,
maintenance) due to configuration
standardization
- Decreased cross-decking, cannibalization, and
de con f i gura t i on efforts in case of
suspension/delay in retrofit program




- Increased efforts by NAVAIR and ASO in
identifying and expediting spares to support
modifications
2 . Benefits :
- Increased aircraft readiness due to improved
spares support
- Less expediting costs in meeting customer
demands
- Decreased cross-decking and cannibalization
efforts
RECOMMENDATION 7—CONTRACT FOR INTERIM SUPPORT IN CASES
WHERE NAVY SPARES SUPPORT CANNOT KEEP PACE
1. Costs:
- Increased purchasing costs due to small
quantity buying and vendor services
- Less pressure on Navy spares support structure
to keep pace with modifications
2 . Benefits :
- Increased aircraft readiness due to improved
spares support
- Less Navy inventory management costs in cases
where contractor manages assets
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- Less expediting costs in meeting customer
demands
- Decreased cross-decking and cannibalization
efforts
H. RECOMMENDATION 8—IMPROVE TAILORING OF RETAIL ALLOWANCES




- Increased efforts by ASO in managing tailored
inventories
- Increased coordination between all echelons in
continual updating process required under
tailoring concept
2 Benefits :
- Increased aircraft readiness due to improved
spares support (primarily in cases where
initial asset shortages are overcome via
tailoring)
- Fewer assets required in inventory during the
modification process
- Less expediting costs in meeting customer
demands
- Decreased cross-docking and cannibalization
efforts
RECOMMENDATION 9—INCREASE REVIEW AND VALIDATION OF
INTERCHANGEABILITY CODES FOR SYSTEMS BEING MODIFIED
1. Costs:
- Increased efforts by NAVAIR and ASO to ensure
interchangeability codes for modified items are
valid
2 . Benefits :
- Increased aircraft readiness due to both
decreases in issue of erroneous stock and
increases in issue of valid substitutes
- Improved management of AVDLR budget at NAS
level by improving the tracking and crediting of
NRFI repairables
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- Less expediting costs in meeting customer
demands
- Decreased cross-decking and cannibalization
efforts
RECOMMENDATION 10—REDESIGN THE FGC/INTERCHANGEABILITY





- System enhancements in the management of all
three inventory levels
- Increased complexity in inventory management
2 . Benefits :
- Increased aircraft readiness due to improved
stockage and issue of valid stock
- Less expediting costs in meeting customer
demands
- Decreased cross-decking and cannibalization
efforts
K. RECOMMENDATION 11 --CENTRALLY FUND REQUIREMENTS FOR
MODIFICATION OF INSTALLED COMPONENTS
1 . Costs :
- No significant net costs
2 Benefits :
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